01. The Real Threat Model
None of these require a sophisticated attacker. A retrieval query that isn't scoped correctly, an evaluation suite that doesn't cover a real failure mode, or cost monitoring that only checks aggregate spend, all create exposure through ordinary gaps, not novel attacks.
02. Specific Risks
- Cross-tenant data leakage — retrieval or context construction that isn't strictly scoped per tenant, especially in shared vector stores or caching layers.
- Prompt injection within a tenant — user-supplied or retrieved content manipulating model behavior within that tenant's own session.
- Margin erosion — usage growth eroding gross margin silently because cost isn't attributed and monitored per tenant.
- Provider dependency risk — a single upstream model provider outage or behavior change taking down the product with no fallback.
03. Defenses That Work
- Tenant isolation enforced at the database layer, tested directly with adversarial cross-tenant queries, not assumed from application code alone.
- All retrieved and user-supplied content treated as untrusted input when constructing model context.
- Per-tenant and per-feature cost attribution visible in dashboards from launch, with cost regression testing on every change.
- Model abstraction with fallback routing so a single provider's outage or degradation doesn't take down the whole product.
04. What to Ask a Vendor
- How is tenant isolation tested, and can you show adversarial cross-tenant test results?
- How is cost attributed per tenant, and how quickly would margin erosion be caught?
- What happens if the primary model provider has an outage?
See our AI SaaS development guide for how these controls fit into the full product architecture.
05. Frequently Asked
Can one tenant's data leak into another tenant's AI output?
It can, if retrieval and context construction aren't strictly scoped per tenant at the database layer. This is one of the most serious risks specific to multi-tenant AI products and needs to be verified through testing, not assumed from application-level checks alone.
Can a prompt injection attack cross tenant boundaries?
If tenant isolation is enforced correctly at the data layer, a prompt injection in one tenant's content shouldn't be able to access another tenant's data, but it can still manipulate behavior within its own tenant's session. Both need independent defenses.
How do we catch margin erosion before it becomes a real problem?
Per-tenant and per-feature cost attribution visible from launch, not retrofitted after a quarter of unexplained margin decline. Cost regression testing on every change that touches the AI layer catches expensive regressions before they ship.
Cloudz Computing enforces tenant isolation at the database layer and tests it directly, not by trusting application-level checks alone.
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